But this means, Socrates argues, that we are forced to reject the second option: the fact that the gods love something cannot explain why the pious is the pious (10d). Socrates and Euthyphro both contemplate the first option: surely the gods love the pious because it is the pious. Socrates asks whether the gods love the pious because it is the pious, or whether the pious is pious only because it is loved by the gods (10a). Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only that which is loved by all of the gods unanimously (9e).Īt this point the dilemma surfaces. Euthyphro proposes (6e) that the pious ( τὸ ὅσιον) is the same thing as that which is loved by the gods ( τὸ θεοφιλές), but Socrates finds a problem with this proposal: the gods may disagree among themselves (7e). Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the nature of piety in Plato's Euthyphro. Ever since Plato's original discussion, this question has presented a problem for some theists, though others have thought it a false dilemma, and it continues to be an object of theological and philosophical discussion today. Gottfried Leibniz asked whether the good and just "is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just". The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, "Is the pious ( τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" ( 10a)Īlthough it was originally applied to the ancient Greek pantheon, the dilemma has implications for modern monotheistic religions.
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